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1. In troduction

O

n January 22, 2009, President Obama issued three executive orders m andating, among other things, a review o f US detention policy, a review o f US
interrogation policy, and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility as
soon as practicable and, in any case, within a year of the order. With these orders,
the President ensured that the US governm ent would revisit a whole range of domestic and international legal positions governing its use of force against al Qaeda
and the Taliban. two groups with which it has been engaged in armed conflict since
late 200 1.
One issue which the new administration m ay have occasion to consider in the
context of the above-m entioned reviews, and as it contemplates further military
engagem ent in Afghanistan, is the question of which bod y of international law governs the use of force by the United States in extraterritorial armed conflicts-and,
in particular, whether the governing international legal regime is the law of armed
conflict, hum an rights law or some combination of the t wo. In this area, the new
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administration will be working against a backdrop of a US government position
that was vigorously advanced by (though in many respects it did not originate
with) the Bush administration to the effect that US human rights obligations do
not apply to actions arising in extraterritorial armed conflicts, both because of
treaty-based territorial limitations and because of the doctrine of lex specialis.
Given the work that lies ahead, it seems a useful moment to pause and revisit
some of the key legal and policy arguments advanced by the Bush administration
and in some cases its allies or other commentators in this sensitive area. The purpose of this article is not either to advocate or criticize these arguments or to offer a
view about whether departure from them is legally available. Instead, it is to lay
down a marker on where the prior administration and like-minded participants in
the discussion of these issues stood as the transition to a new US administration approached. As discussed in greater detail below, the arguments advanced by this
group drew from, among other things, a combination of observations about (I )
historical US positions on the territorial limitations of human rights obligations,
(2) uncertainty in international case law about the extent to which human rights
obligations extend into extraterritorial anned-conflict situations and (3) practical
challenges faced by European allies operating within a human rights legal framework in Afghanistan.
II. Overview: General Legal Framework for Military Operations against al
Qaeda and the Taliban as 0/2008
By way of background, it is useful to review the legal framework in which the
United States conducted military operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban in
2008 . Between 2001 and 2008, the primary legal basis for the US government's use
of force against these groups remained largely the same, while the legal framework
for its treatment of detainees changed dramatically (with all three branches of government taking steps to provide additional measures of protection to detainees).
The US government's approach to diplomacy concerning these issues changed as
well, with an increasing emphasis after 2004 on outreach to European and other
close allies to seek common ground on the international legal framework concerning the use offorce against transnational terrorists. But despite important legal and
policy changes during this period, including the US Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, I which recognized the right of Guantanamo detainees
to challenge the legality of their detentions in US courts (albeit on constitutional
rather than human rights law grounds), the United States maintained its legal position with respect to the non-application of its human rights obligations to extraterritorial armed conflicts.
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From 200 1 through 2008, the basis for o perations rested on the premise that
the United States was in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan-a conflict arising out of a series of attacks against the United States,
culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001, to which the United States responded in self-defense as notified to the UN Security Council in October 200 1.2
During the ensuing seven years, US operations were divided between two coalitions. Some US fo rces fought as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a
US-led coalition that operated with the consent of the post-Taliban elected government in Afghanistan. 3 Others fought under the auspices of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-a NATO-led coalition that operated both with
the consent of the Afghan government and under a UN Security Council mandate.4 As a result, the legal basis for US operations in Afghanistan might be described as "self-defense plus," with the " plus" being consent of the Afghan
government and, in the ISAF case, a UN Security Council mandate. As a matter of
domestic law, Congress recognized the US government's right to use force in selfdefense in its Authorization to Use Military Force dated September 18,2001," and
the Suprem e Court confirmed its right to detain combatants as an incident of its
right to use fo rce in its Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision in 2004.6
Questions about how to classify the conflict, and what protections detainees
should receive, were the source of more pronounced movement in the law. The
initial position of the US government at the beginning of the fighting in Afghanistan was to treat the conflicts with both groups as international in character, given
that neither was limited to a conflict within the territory of a single State, but to
deny detainees captured in the conflicts protections under the Geneva Conventions/ With respect to the Taliban, the US government concluded that the conflict
was governed by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions! because the
Taliban qualified as a high contracting party to the Conventions (in light ofits governing role in Afghanistan ), but that Taliban fighters did not meet the criteria set
forth in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. President Bush determined that
Taliban detainees accordingly would not benefit from prisoner of war protections.
As concerns al Qaeda, the US government concluded that because the group was
not a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, it was not eligible for any
protections under those treaties. In the case of both groups, the US government
took the position that Common Article 39 was inapplicable, because it governed
only conflicts of a non-international character. 10
In 2006, the landscape shifted when the Supreme Court heJd in Hamdan v.
Rllmsfe1d that the conflict with al Qaeda is of a non-international character and
that Common Article 3 accordingly applies as a matter of treaty law. II While
Hamdan did not speak to the legal protections that apply with respect to the
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Taliban, the Department of Defense issued, in the same year, a detainee directive
that applied Common Article 3 and additional protections as a baseline to all Department of Defense detention operations. These protections were in addition to
certain administrative procedures that the Department of Defense created through
separate m echanisms to review whether detainees were being properly detained as
combatants and, on a periodic basis, whether they posed a threat sufficient to merit
continued detention.12
In 2008, the Supreme Court determined in Boumediene v. Bush that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals created for purposes ofGuantanamo status reviews
were not an adequate and e ffe ctive substitute for the ab ility to seek the writ of
habeas corpus, and that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to contest the legality of their detentions in a habeas proceeding in US courts.i3 It remained unclear, however, whether the federal courts would extend habeas rights to
detention operations at facilities such as Bagram in Afghanistan where the US governm ent exercises control short of the total and indefinite control the Court
deemed it to enjoy at Guantanamo. 14
While the courts were changing the legal landscape, the US government was
working to change the diplomatic landscape. Following the 2004 election, the prior
administration began to expand its outreach to foreig n governments on detentionrelated issues, responding in part to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission 15
that the United States should engage its allies to develop a common framework for
the treatment and detention of terrorists. A major them e of this outreach effort was
to underscore that the international legal fram ework governing military operations, and in particular detention operations, in extraterritorial non-international
armed conflict was underdeveloped. Department of State Legal Adviser John Bellinger argued that among the fundamental issues that the law of armed conflict
failed to address were questions about whom a State could hold as enem y
belligerents, what sort of status determination procedures detainees should receive, how to determine when the end of conflict had arrived such that detainees
must be released, and what sort of"non-refoulement" style protections should apply
to the transfer or release of detainees outside a State's territol)'.1 6
The US government under the prior administration argued that these ungoverned areas in the law of armed conflict presented troubling areas of uncertainty
for the US government, its allies and its courts (all of which had reason to be concerned about the conduct of detention operations in the absence of clear legal guidance) . But the government nevertheless resisted the position-advanced by
human rights advocates, the International Committee of the Red Cross and othersthat human rights law did or should present a legal basis for filling them. While the
US governm ent agreed that consideration should be given as to how the legal
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framework governing non-international armed conflict should be expanded, it
also maintained that an across-the-board acceptance of the application ofhwnan
rights principles in conflict was not required by law and was to some extent unrealistic as a matter of policy. 17 The balance of this article describes certain legal and
practical arguments that the prior administration (and in some cases its allies) advanced in support of this position.

III. Legal Arguments
This section highlights three of the arguments that the prior administration---or,
in one case, the government of Canada-advanced in support of its legal position
concerning the territorial limitations of certain human rights obligations. One argument the US government advanced was that both the text and the negotiating
history of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights l8 (which, as the
most comprehensive articulation of relevant human r ights obligations to which
the United States is party, was the focus of much of the debate in this area ) indicated that it was only intended to apply within a State's own territory. Another argument was that even States purporting to apply the law of armed conflict and
human rights law conjointly to extraterritorial armed conflicts did not appear to
have a clear understanding about how to balance certain fundamental tensions between the two bodies oflaw. A third relevant argument-advanced in litigation between the Canadian government and Amnesty International-was that certain key
decisions by foreign courts and international tribunals reflected a persistent uncertainty about whether and to what extent human rights law should apply in extraterritorial armed conflicts.
A. Text and History
The prior administration's positions with respect to the text and history of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were thoroughly explored in the
US government's 2005 report to the UN Human Rights Committee (the body of
experts who review treaty reports under the Covenant)l9 and elsewhere. 2o The arguments begin with the text of Article 2, which provides that a State party will apply
the Covenant to persons "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." While
overtime commentators, including Thomas Buergenthal,21 the UN Committee on
Human Rights, and some courts developed arguments that Article 2 should be interpreted to mean that obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights apply to a State's conduct toward persons who are either in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction, the US government continued to take the view
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that the plainest reading of the text is that both territory and jurisdiction requirements must be met in order for the Covenant to apply.
Moreover, the US government took the position-for example, in its observations to the UN Committee on Human Rights' General Comment 3 I-that, to the
extent it was necessary to look beyond the text of Article 2 to the travaux
priparatoires to clarify the intent of the framers in drafting the provision, the
travaux fully supported the US government perspective on the scope of the Covenant. 22 Here, the US government noted that Eleanor Roosevelt and the US team
negotiating the Covenant had insisted on the reference to "territoty" in Article 2
because they did not believe it would be practicable to apply the guarantees of the
Covenant extraterritorially-specifically in situations of occupation. 23 The US delegation encountered resistance from certain other delegations, which tried to
amend the operative language that constrained the application of the Covenant to
a State's own territory, but the US position prevailed. 24 By way of context, commentators have noted that the post-war environment in which the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was framed was one in which much of the
international community saw the law of armed conflict and human rights law as
coming from different sources and occupying different spheres-with human
rights law being derived from enlightenment-era principles about the affirmative
rights of individuals vis-a.-vis their governments, and the law of armed conflict being a mostly restrictive set of principles reflecting a grand bargain among States
about the proper balance of military necessity against humanitarian limits.25
The prior administration also noted that, while certain other governments and
international bodies had subsequently accepted a broader interpretation of the
scope of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the US government's position had been consistent across decades and administrations-and had been advanced not only by Mrs. Roosevelt at the time the Covenant was negotiated but also by State Department Legal Adviser Conrad Harper in
the first US report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1995. 26
B. The Nuclear WeaponslWall Conundrum

One of the key sources of the position that human rights law and the law of armed
conflict apply conjointly in the context of international armed conflict is a 1996 advisoryopinion of the International Court of Justice, the so-called Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion. In that opinion the ICJ wrote as follows:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant [onJ Civil and
Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national
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emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle.
the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be detennined by the
applicable lex specialis, namely. the law applicable in anned conflict which is designed
to regulate the conduct ofhostilitiesF
Several years later, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the IC} reinforced and elaborated on its Nuclear Weapons holding as follows:
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights
conventions does not cease in case of anned conflict, save through the effect of
provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A$ regards the relationship between
international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law;
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of
both these branches of intemationallaw. In order to answer the question put to it, the
Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law,
namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law. 28
When these two IC} passages are read together, the key p rinciples that emerge appear to be that ( I ) human rights law continues to apply in armed conflict; (2) in
armed conflict, some rights may be governed by human rights law, some by the law
of armed conflict, and some b y both; and (3) when a human rights rule is in conflict with a law of armed conflict rule, the law of armed conflict takes precedence as

lex specialis.29
In reflecting on whether tensions between hum an rights law and the law of
armed conflict could be reconciled by applying these or other principles, the prior
administration noted that reconciliation might be achieved in some cases, but
would be difficult if not impossible in others. One area where it acknowledged that
the two bodies might be reconciled concerns the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of one's life, as set forth in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 30 Here, the US government's analysis tracked that of the IC},
which discussed the application of Article 6 in armed conflict in the above-quoted
language from its Nuclear Weapons opinion. The IC} found that in armed conflict,
Article 6 continues to ap ply, but that a d eprivation of life would not be deemed arbitrary fo r purposes of Article 6 if it occurred in a man ner that complied with the
law of armed conflict (i.e., in a manner consistent with the principles of proportionalityand distinction, and that did not run afoul of any other treaty or customary international law rule) . The Nuclear Weapons discussion of Article 6 does not
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make entirely clear whether the law of armed conflict rule displaces the human
rights rule (suggesting that in cases where there is a violation the remedy is limited
to what is afforded under the law of armed conflict) or whether it more accurately
gives content to a human rights rule while the two rules apply simultaneously (suggesting that where there is a violation the individual is accountable under both human rights law and the law of armed conflict). It does, however, make dear that
action consistent with the law of armed conflict is not a human rights violation.
But the prior administration also suggested that commentators calling for the
joint application ofhwnan rights law and the law of armed conflict had failed to
give meaningful guidance on how to achieve reconciliation between the two bodies
of law where the tension between them is more nuanced-for example, on the issue
of whether an individual detained in armed conflict may seek review of detention
in court. Here, the Geneva Conventions do not offer procedures by which combatants may challenge the legality of their detentions, either in international or noninternational armed conflict. By contrast, Article 9 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights prohibits arbitral)' detention and provides a right of
review for all prisoners and detainees. A question that accordingly presents itself is
whether the absence of a procedure for judicial review of detentions under the
Geneva Conventions suggests that the law of armed conflict is not, on this point,
the lex specialis, leaving human rights law to furnish the relevant rule. In reflecting
on this issue, US Legal Adviser lohn Bellinger asked:
Would it be practical to expect States detaining tens of thousands of unprivileged
combatants in a non-international armed conflict to bring them before a judge without
delay? This is not something States must do even for prisoners of war under the Third
Geneva Convention. If the answer is that the State should derogate from Article 9 if the
exigencies of a civil war sodemand, then what contribution has human rights law made
to answering questions regarding the procedures owed combatants in noninternational armed conflict? 31

An area of similarly subtle tension between the two bodies oflaw concerns the

principle of "'non-refoulement." Under hwnan rights law, the principle of nonrefoulement (memorialized in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, lnhwnan or Degrading Treatment or Punishment n and elsewhere)
provides a safeguard against the transfer of individuals to situations where they are
likely to be tortured. As Legal Adviser Bellinger noted, however, the law of armed
conflict provides for no such protection with respect to the transfer of prisoners of
war and other detainees at the end of an armed conflict. 33 While in practice the prior
administration looked to human rights law to guide its transfer policy with respect to
individuals detained in the conflict with aI Qaeda (for example, it established a firm
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policy against transferring Guantanamo detainees to countries where it determined
they were more likely than not to be tortured}, Bellinger noted the complications
that arose as a result, obseIVing that "[t[his policy, central as it is to Western values,
has meant that dozens of detainees who cannot be repatriated ... have remained at
Guantanamo for years after we have wished to transfer them."}4
In a similar vein , the prior administration's pleadings in Munaf v. Geren
also pointed to certain sovereignty-related complications that may arise
through the application of human rights non-refoulement principles in armed
conflict-particularly when one State is conducting hostilities against a non-State
actor on another State's territory. In Munaf v. Geren, the US government argued
that the Supreme Court should deny the relief sought by two American citizens
held in Iraq, who had requested that the Court enjoin the US government from
turning them over to the government of Iraq for prosecution, because of their
concerns about post-transfer mistreatment. 3s In ruling fo r the government, the
Court appeared to weigh human rights considerations-noting, among other
things, the US government's statement that it had a policy not to transfer individuals in cases where torture would likely result- but also appeared to place greater
emphasis on Iraq's legitimate sovereign interest in bringing to justice individuals
accused of committing crimes on its territory. The Court wrote that
because Omar and Munaf [the two prisoners} are being held by United States Armed
Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government pending their prosecution in Iraqi
courts ... release of any kind [as opposed to transferring the detainees to Iraqi custody]
would interfere with the sovereign authority of Iraq "to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders."36

In this passage, the Court highlighted one of the quandaries that a State may face
when it seeks to apply its human rights standards on the territory of another State
and accordingly appeared to echo the concern expressed by the US delegation that
negotiated the text of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights-Le., that it might not be possible for States to enforce their human rights
obligations outside their sovereign territory.
C. Uncertain Litigation Landscape
Another relevant argument-this one successfully advanced by the Canadian government in its litigation with Amnesty International-was that international legal
precedent concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations
in armed conflict is unsettled, and that to the extent it supports the extraterritorial
application of human rights obligations, it does so only in limited cases.37
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The Canadian government advanced this argum ent in defending a lawsuit
brought by Amnesty International. Amnesty had sued Canada under the Canadian
Charter38 to prevent it from transferring detainees captured in Afghanistan to
Afghan custody, because of non -refoulement concerns. Because the q uestion of
whether the Canadian Charter applies extraterritorially turns in part on the question
of whether Canada's international human rights obligations apply in Afghanistan,
the Canadian governm ent's pleadings explored foreign and international case law
concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. In its
pleadings, the Canadian government observed that the Grand Cham ber of the European Court of Human Rights had ruled in its Batlkovic390pinion of2001 that the
scope of the European Convention o n Human Rights40 is normally confmed to the
territorial limits of the Convention's contracting States. While Batlkovic acknowledged that the Euro pean Convention on Human Rights applies extraterritorially in
certain cases (e.g., where the conduct in question occurs in a State's embassies,
consulates. airplanes or vessels. and in cases where a State exercises some or all of the
public powers in the territory of another State) the Court ruled that no such additional basis existed in the context of a NATO bombing raid on a Serbian radio station
that killed sixteen people. 41
The Canadian trial court hearing the case acknowledged that several subseq uent European Court of H uman Rights cases appeared to go considerably further than Batlkovic on the question of when the European Convention on Human
Rights applies extraterritorially (e.g., by finding that the Convention may apply
when a contracting State has effective control over a particular person outside its
own borders. regardless of whether it controls the territory where that person is
being held) but took the position that these cases do not take precedence over the
Grand Chamber's decision in Batlkovic.42 In ruling for the Canadian government.
the court concluded that as a whole the body of juris prudence relating to the extraterritorial application of human rights law appeared " uncertain,"43 and that the
Charter accordingly did not confer rights on Afghans detained by Canadian forces
in Afghanistan. 44

IV. Practical Issues: Afghanistan
Moving from law to practice, commentators observing ISAF/NATO o perations in
Afghanistan noted certain practical concerns arising from the application of human rights obligations in extraterritorial armed conflict.
One concern relates to operational constraints that human rights law im poses
on combat operations. In May 2008. a European news magazine reported that a
European partner in the ISAf coalition had failed to capture a Taliban leader who
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was believed by NATO commanders to be active in planting roadside bombs and
sheltering suicide bombers, and to be responsible for a 2007 attack on a sugar factory that had resulted in almost eighty deaths. When an effort to capture this individual failed, the coalition partner's troops had an opportunity to target him, but
had to pull back because they lacked the authorization to do so, permitting him to
flee. A senior official from this coalition partner explained to the magazine that "a
fugitive like [the escaped Taliban leader[ is not an aggressor and should not be shot
unless necessary."4SThe magazine additionally reported that this coalition partner
considered "[t[he use of lethal force [to bel prohibited unless an attack is taking
place or is imminent."46 The emphasis on using force only in self-defense suggested
that either the coalition partner did not believe itself to be engaged in an armed
conflict, or that it had nevertheless instructed its troops to act in accordance with a
human rights law framework and treat its Afghan operations as a law enforcement
exercise. The magazine noted that this coalition partner considered the different
approaches by its allies to targeting in Afghanistan as "not being in conformity with
international law" and suggested that the difference in legal approaches contributed to "tension and friction" among NATO partners. 47 The magazine's account
accordingly suggested that the application of human rights law may impede effective military operations both by limiting the scope of operational flexibility where
applied to the exclusion oflaw of armed conflict principles and by creating coordination issues between coalition partners.
A second concern that has been raised by commentators is that the discrepancy
between US and European approaches to detention may be partly responsible for
having impaired the ability of NATOIISAF to conduct effective detention operations. Under a rule that applies to all NATOIISAF forces (including US components under NATOIISAF command), forces are generally prohibited from holding
detainees for longer than ninety-six hours before transferring them to Afghan authorities.48 This system avoids legal and other complications that might arise out of
meruum- or long-term detention, particularly for States that might face challenges
under the European Convention on H uman Rights, but it has its costs. In 2006,
David Bosco, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, wrote that, as a result of
this system,
NATO troops have no system in place fo r regularly interrogating Taliban fighters for
intelligence purposes. Whenever possible, they let the Afghan troops they operate with
take custody. When that's not possible, they house their prisoners briefly in makeshift
facilities while they arrange a transfer to the Afghans. NATO guidelines call for the
handover of prisoners within 96 hours, far too brief a time for soldiers to even know
whom they're holding. And once prisoners are in Afghan hands, international forces
easily lose track of them.49
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Human rights advocates such as Amnesty International have also criticized the
ninety-six-hour rule-from a different angle-arguing that it actually creates
human rights concerns, because it requires the transfer of detainees to Afghan authorities notwithstanding what Amnesty has argued to be an unacceptable risk of
mistreatment. Indeed, it was concern about NATO/ISAF transfer policies that led
Amnesty to bring the above-described lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government of
Canada from transferring detainees to Afghan custody pending an improvement
in post-transfer human rights safeguards.

v. Conclusion
As discussed, the prior administration took the view that the law of armed conflict
did not provide an adequate legal framework for addressing all of the issues that
arise in armed conflict with non-State groups, but argued that legal and policy considerations weighed against the notion that gaps in the framework should be filled
simply by looking to human rights law. Instead, it emphasized that the international community needed to work together to develop new approaches that would
address the gaps while steering clear of the legal and policy pitfalls it associated with
the application of human rights law in armed conflict. 50 The new administration
will, of course, develop its own views about where the gaps lie and how to address
them. In determining whether or how to depart from the path taken by the prior
administration, a firs t step will be to look back at some of the arguments and concerns described in this article and elsewhere that helped to put the US government
on its present course.
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